Achievements and Challenges of the CEWARN Mechanism in Ethiopia

Bizusew Mersha

CEWARN was established as a specialized unit of IGAD in 2003. The rationale for establishing the mechanism was the growing awareness among member states that in order to achieve development in the region existing and potential conflicts in the region needed to be prevented or mitigated. The objective of CEWARN is to enable member states to prevent conflicts, particularly pastoral conflicts, from escalating into violent armed conflicts on greater scale and enable local communities to play an important part in the prevention. It aims at achieving this objective through collection of data, analysis and verification, and formulation of scenarios and response options, to support decision-makers’ ability to identify critical developments at an early stage and develop response strategies. CEWARN, thus, aims at closely linking early warning with early response. Currently, the mechanism focuses on cross border pastoral conflicts and is operational in two entry points, namely the Karamoja and Somali clusters.

The CEWARN Mechanism in Ethiopia

Closely following the establishment of the CEWARN unit at the regional level, the CEWARN mechanism in Ethiopia was established in 2003. The mechanism, in line with the protocol to establish CEWARN, has two main components, and all key elements of these components have been set up in some form, except for the local committees. These components are the early warning system and the early response unit, known as Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit (CEWERU).

Early warning Component

Institutionally, the early warning system is a network consisting of a National Research Institute (NRI), Country Coordinators (CC) and field monitors (FM). The main task of this network is to systematically collect data, monitor and submit report about events likely to lead to violence in areas of operation, using an empirically based standard format that is coded into the so-called CEWARN Reporter.

As stipulated on the CEWARN protocol, the CEWARN unit identified and commissioned the National Research Institute for Ethiopia (Inter Africa Group[i]) to operate the early warning component of the mechanism. The NRI, together with the CEWARN unit, selected the country coordinators and field monitors that carry out the actual task of information collection, analysis and production of early warning reports.

A total of six field monitors and two country coordinators were selected in this process. The field monitors, which are “the beginning and end of CEWARN’s data collection”, are selected based on the criteria of their local understanding and insights in the clusters’ ethnic/political structures and developments. Most of them were born and raised in the area and have basic analytical skills. They are currently working in the area either as teachers or as staff of NGOs. Their main task is to collect relevant open source information from the specific area of the cluster he/she is stationed. They are paid a modest remuneration for their work and all their communication costs are covered by the NRI.

Similarly, the country coordinator and assistant country coordinator (ACC) are selected based on the requirements of good analytical skills and insight in local, regional and national socio-economic political structures, policies and developments. They have a higher education of master equivalent in social sciences. They are attached to the NRI. The country coordinators are responsible for overall functioning of Information Collection Network (ICN), evaluating and verifying the quality of FM data, coding the data with CEWARN Reporter as well as analyzing and producing early warning reports.

Methodology and process of ICN and production of early warning reports

The CEWARN mechanism employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to collect data, analyze and produce early warning reports. They are assisted by a special early warning software known as CEWARN Reporter.[ii]

As indicated above, the collection of early warning data is entrusted to field monitors. In line with the CEWARN protocol, the field monitors collect information about the area from open sources using overt means. These include informants, personal observation and local media. The field reports come into two formats, namely incident and situation reports. The incident report captures incidents displaying physical violence or being of violent nature that have relevance to the escalation of sub-national, national or cross border pastoral conflict in the reporting area the FM is stationed. Each incident must have an initiator, a certain action/happening, a recipient, and must be located in time and space. The situation report, on the other hand, has 52 indicators that capture events/ action that contribute, on the one hand, to an easing of tension and de-escalation of conflict, or, on the other hand, that lead to an escalation or destabilization of the area of reporting. These indicators, together with content of the incident reports, were developed after CEWARN organized a stakeholder’s workshop to identify indicators pertinent to the clusters in 2002.

The FMs fill and send the incident reports to the NRI whenever incidents occur in the area. The FMs fill the situation reports weekly and are expected to send them every week. However, owing to poor infrastructure in the area, the reports usually reached  the NRI with a delay of 10 to 15 days. When these two reports reached to the NRI, the CCs and ACCs code and register the reports into the CEWARN Reporter. The CEWARN Reporter assists the event date analysis methodology used by CEWARN to generate its early warning reports. Expressed in very simple way, the logic of event data analysis could be described as follows: all events considered relevant to conflict/peace (the 52 indicators) are assigned a certain numeric value on a conflict/peace scale. These values can then be aggregated for specific timeframes and displayed graphically in a curve on a timeline. The CC and ACC interpret these values using context-specific analysis and generate reports accordingly. The CCs also control the quality of the data through cross-checking and communicating back to FMs to verify and rectify the data when necessary. In this regard, the CEWARN units also control the quality and timely encoding of data into the database. The CCs then produce three types of reports. These are baseline reports, quarterly updates and early warning alerts.

Baseline reports are initial reports of the clusters that aim at giving an overview of the conflict profile of the area. They contain the cause, actors, history and dynamics of the conflict as well as the socio-economic and political situation of the area. The quarterly updates are standardized reports that are produced on a quarterly basis. They present both positive and negative precursors to the pastoral conflict situation for the past four months as a means to illuminate trends and patterns that can help signaling imminent escalation or mitigate ongoing conflicts in the cluster. They contain the total number and type of incidents, the number of human deaths and livestock loss, and a description of situations that gave rise to conflicts and peace. In addition they analyze structural and proximate conflict aggravating and mitigating factors for the period of review. They also include short and long term recommendations.

The alerts are special reports that are produced whenever a situation of impending crisis of a large scale arises that require a quick response.

Recently, additional reports are being produced by the NRI. These are called monthly reports and they describe the conflict and peace situation of the previous month and are intended to feed into the quarterly updates and keep track of developments in the area.

The CEWARN in operation                         

The CEWARN Mechanism in Ethiopia is currently operational in two regional clusters: the so-called Karamoja and Somali clusters. The former is fully operational while the later is more recent. Data collection and process of reports production for the Karamoja cluster are operational since August 2003. The three field monitors in the cluster are regularly sending information collected in the area. A baseline study of the area was produced in April 2004. Quarterly updates have been produced on time. These reports were submitted to CEWERU, were discussed and adopted formally by the CEWERU steering committee. They are now posted on the CEWARN website for public use. In addition two alerts about impending crises were produced in July and September 2005 and generated early response from CEWERU, with, as a result, the prevention of a further escalation. Monthly reports have started to be produced since May 2005.

Various trainings were given to the field monitors by both CEWARN and NRI to improve their reporting skills. As a result, the quality of the reports received from the field improved. The CCs also were offered training by CEWARN unit on the CEWARN methodology. Many discussions were held between CEWARN, CCs, and CEWERU to assess the activities of the mechanism, find solutions to the existing gaps in the data collection, improve the quality of the data itself, as well as establish a better linkage between the NRI, CEWERU and the CEWARN unit.

The early response unit (CEWERU)

The early response unit, as per the protocol, consists of three organs; a steering committee, a focal point and local committees. The focal point, as per the protocol, is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry serves as a focal point for all communication between CEWERU and CEWARN. The Africa Desk of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is entrusted with this task since 2003 in Ethiopia . The steering committee of CEWERU in Ethiopia was established in 2004. Members of the steering committee are drawn from federal government institutions, MPs, CSOs and research institutes. The NRI is also part of the CEWERU steering committee. In the Ethiopian case, the local committees have yet to be established. There are now efforts to establish this organ.

The functions of CEWERU include collecting information relevant to early warning and response, undertaking and reviewing preliminary analysis of the collected information, formulating and initiating response strategies, liaising and cooperating with CSOs and other structures outside CEWARN, and communicating with the CEWARN unit.

According to the rules and procedures governing its meeting, the steering committee will hold four ordinary meetings per year; emergency meetings of steering committee may be convened as deemed necessary upon the request by any member of the committee. The meetings of the steering committee so far coincide with the production of early warning reports by the NRI so as to discuss the reports together with other items of the agenda.

The CEWARN protocol calls for the establishment of CEWERU in the most suitable administrative location leaving the decision to the member states. Currently, the CEWERU in Ethiopia is housed in the ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, it has neither dedicated staff nor a proper budget to run its operation. Rules and procedures that govern its relation with existing government structures and the soon to be established local committees are not yet clear.

CEWERU past activities

By the time of the writing (April 2006), the CEWERU steering committee had held around four meetings since its formal establishment. During these meetings, the steering committee had reviewed, debated, and adopted four quarterly updates and one baseline study and had referred them to Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS). Two of these reports were discussed and adopted at the CPS regional meetings held in Addis Ababa and Kenya . The remaining reports referred to the CPS were still pending at the time of the writing, the CPS meetings having yet to be convened.

In addition, the head of the steering committee have reviewed the two early warning alerts that required quick responses and referred them to the pertinent member institutions to take action. Based on these alerts, the institutions have reacted using their own structure to avert the crises.

Understanding the need to establish a local committee, the steering committee is now taking the necessary measures to create the local committees using fund obtained from German Technical Cooperation (GTZ).

The Linkage between the Early Warning Component and the Response Unit

Many argue the uniqueness and strength of CEWARN mechanism lies in its ability to create an appropriate linkage between the early warning system and early response units. This structure and linkage are also emulated at the national level.

As discussed earlier, both the early warning and the response units have been established and are operational in Ethiopia . The two units are also linked institutionally and operationally. The NRI, represented by CC and ACC, is a member of the steering committee of the CEWERU. As part of the steering committee, the NRI attend CEWERU meetings and, together with other members, participate in the formulation and adoption of response strategies as well as in other matters directly related to CEWERU activities.

Conversely, the CEWERU has a role in the early warning activity. It has the mandate to collect and provide information for early warning reports/alerts; it has the right to review, comment and amend early warning reports submitted to them. The CEWERU has also access to the raw field reports so it can keep track of developments as well as check the accuracies and analysis of early warning reports.

However, the later linkage is not fully operational in the Ethiopian case. This, again, is mainly due to absence of a network of local committees and the gaps in the institutionalization of CEWERU.

Case study: CEWARN alerts and early responses

In order to show how the early warning and early response units actually interoperate, the example of the two alerts generated by the early warning system can be useful. These two alerts were followed by a number of measures undertaken by CEWERU that allowed the conflicts to quickly de-escalate and the situation to return to normal. The two alerts were produced on July 27 and September, 2005 respectively.

CEWARN Alert I, July 27,2005

The first CEWARN alert was related to a conflict that occurred between two cross-border pastoral communities, namely the Dassench of Ethiopia and the Turkana of Kenya. The conflict emerged from the increasing fishing activities on Lake Turkana (Rudolph) by the Dassench fishermen who worked for a government owned enterprise, the Ethiopia Fishing and Marketing enterprise. The Turkana fishermen felt that the increase would deplete the fishing resources of the lake and thus threaten their income/livelihood. Moreover, some of their long time clients, the Kenya Somali traders, began to turn to the Dassench fishermen attracted by the lower prices the later were offering them.

The Turkana launched 10 separate attacks between June 13 and July 23 on the Dassench fishermen to disrupt their fishing activities on the lake. In these attacks, they managed to steal 47 fishing nets. On July 27, the situation escalated to a more alarming level. On that day, the Dassench encircled and ambushed the Turkana who came on motorboats to steal fishing nets. They killed nine of them and seized their motorboats. On the following day, around 20 Kenyan security forces came to the Dassench area and killed three Dassench fishermen.

After these incidents, the NRI produced its first early warning alert. The main reasons that led to the decision to produce the alerts were:

a) A new conflict dimension

The NRI had never encountered incidents over fishing activities between these two communities since it began collecting early warming data. There had been and there still are conflicts between these two communities over other issues, mainly over grazing lands and watering points, but not over fishing grounds. This new dimension indicated that the conflict between these two cross-border communities was expanding to other areas/issues.

b) The involvement of security forces

The NRI had not encountered in the past early warning information that alleged the involvement of government security forces in communal conflicts siding with one of the warring parties. So, the intervention of Kenya security forces on the side of Turkana was a new development and was a concern in that it might invite a reciprocal intervention from Ethiopian security forces, which could eventually transform the conflict into a cross border conflict between government forces.

The conflict indicators (the 52 indicators on the Situation reports) during the time showed a marked increase.

The alert, then, was communicated to the CEWERU head through e-mail on July 27, 2005. The head then passed the information to the relevant member institutions of the steering committee – the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Security, Immigration and Refugees Affairs Authority (SIIRA). The two bodies passed the same information with attached request for necessary measures to the regional and district level officials. In the next two weeks, the following activities were witnessed on the ground:

·        Security beefed up on the Ethiopian side of Lake Turkana that restrained the movement of communities in the area. The immediate outcome of this action was a marked decline in fishing net thefts and assaults;

·        Representatives of the local administration, elders and women went to a nearby Kenyan town to discuss about the conflict with their Kenyan counterparts. Both sides agreed in principle to return the stolen fishing nets and find ways the two communities can resume fishing on the lake.

At the federal level, the CEWERU head referred the case to the Ethio-Kenyan joint border commission that is set up to deal with cross borders issues between the two countries. The issue is now one of the cases reviewed by the border commission. The conflict has now more or less de-escalated. Although there were few incidents later in October, they were largely isolated incidents.

CEWARN Alert II, September 9, 2005

The second alert was about the conflict that occurred between two pastoral communities who live on the Ethiopian side of the Karamoja cluster: the Nyangatom and Dassench. The conflict began on June 4, 2005. Up to the time the alert was produced a total of 10 violent incidents of reprisal and counter-reprisal nature occurred between these two communities. As a result of these incidents, 10 people were killed and 220 cattle were stolen. The NRI decided to produce the alerts based on the following reasons:

a) Involvement of elders

The past patterns of pastoral conflicts in the area indicated the elders in these communities normally play a crucial peace-making role. They engage themselves in reconciliation activities and promote the values of prevention. But in this particularly conflict, the elders of both communities were actively encouraging the youth to attack the other by giving pre-raid blessings and post-raid recognitions.

b) Area coverage of the conflict

Most of the conflicts that occurred between the two communities in the past concentrated on few areas. They had not involved the whole communities. In this particular case, the conflict that initially seemed to concentrate on few areas was spreading to other areas. Youth from far away areas (kebeles) were observed coming to the actual incident areas to aid their communities. In addition, elders from far away kebeles were blessing and sending youths to go and fight.

c) Involvements of communities that live across the border

Nyangatom and Topossa communities who live in the neighboring Sudan and who have strong ties with the Nyangatom of Ethiopia began to cross the border to assist the later. This was a concern as it had the potential of transforming what was a local conflict into cross border one, thus complicating further the issue.

d) Limited capacity of the district administration

Following the much contested May election in Ethiopia , there was a reshuffle of officials at the zonal and Wereda level. This reshuffle had created gap and limited the local administration capacity to act and contain the escalating situation.

After we produced the alert based on the above-mentioned reasons, the CCs together with the CEWARN unit staff made an appointment with the CEWERU head for a briefing. After the briefing, the head concurred with us on the need to initiate early actions. He faxed the alert on the same day to selected members of the steering committee – the Ministry of Federal Affairs, SIIRA, the Federal police and Ministry of National Defense. The later replied to the CEWERU head by stating that the ministry had no mandate to intervene in the situation unless it was specifically requested by the regional government as per the constitution. The other member institutions wrote letter to the regional and local government and security institutions to closely monitor the situation and take proper actions. After the message was passed down to the regional and local authorities, the following activities and results were observed:

·        Deployment of local security forces and militia which deterred the two communities from engaging in violent activities;

·        Increased activity by local officials to bring the two communities together and reconcile their differences.

Owing to this increased peace activity by local officials (also assisted by a local NGO), elders of the two communities finally met in October and agreed to resolve the differences. Subsequently, many negotiations and peace conferences were held in November and December, whereby the two communities reached an agreement on many issues, among which were joint utilization of resources and bringing to justice those who committed crimes and disturbed the peace. As a consequence, we observed a marked decline in violent incidents between these two communities. Without taking much of the credit from the efforts of local officials (and some NGOs), it can be fairly argued that the alert and the actions taken by the CEWARN mechanism in Ethiopia has contributed to the emergence of this peaceful relationship between these two communities.

Achievements and challenges of the CEWARN mechanism in Ethiopia

Assessment of the CEWARN mechanism in Ethiopia is discerned from the structure, linkage and activities of its two components. The assessment is not exhaustive and only highlights the main accomplishments and challenges based on the personal observation of the writer in his capacity as the assistant country coordinator for Ethiopia .

Incorporation of CSOs in the mechanism and development of trust and close working relationship between CSOs and government agencies

One of the strengths of CEWARN, many argue, is the involvement of CSOs in its operations. As indicated earlier, the early warning component is handled by CSO or the National Research Institute. This has enabled the collection of data and production of independent, unbiased and objective reports. This arrangement has alleviated the fear that the objectivity of early warning reports could be compromised if they were handled by government agencies due to their vested interests. This does not mean, however, that all CSOs are non-partisan and free from vested interests. With this in mind, this fear is counter-checked by the arrangement that requires the reports to be reviewed by the CEWERU before being adopted.

The trust that has developed over time between NRI and CEWERU is also commendable in the Ethiopian context. Members of CEWERU institutions show great esteem in the information and the recommendation put forward in the reports. Some are using the reports for their internal consumption. Suspicion and mistrust towards the reports and the work of NRI are not evident. This trust and collaboration between CSOs and government agencies will be further enhanced by the creation of the local committees. It is already agreed in principle that CSOs and government agencies at the local level will be members of the local committee. Thus, the role of CSOs and collaboration between CSOs and government agencies at the response side would be greatly increased. This collaboration is in line with the growing awareness that the threats to human security are becoming complex and require a concerted effort of various actors at various levels.

Political will

There is a strong positive political will and enthusiasm from the CEWERU side to make the mechanism relevant and effective. This is manifested by the full attendance of member institutions, by the seriousness of reviewing the reports, and by the depth of the discussions during the steering committee meetings.

This political will has also been translated into action. The responses taken following the two consecutive alerts can be mentioned as an example of this development. Similarly, the activities that are now being undertaken to form local committees further underline the fact that the rhetoric has now become reality.

The incremental approach adopted by CEWARN has bored its fruits. It started with relatively less sensitive security issue and contributed therefore to the development of the political good will.

The strength of the early warning unit

Perhaps the most developed unit of the CEWARN mechanism is the early warning unit. The information collection and production of early warning reports is now active and operational. The quality of data collection and the reports generated are constantly improving. This is made possible by a constant reviewing and assessment of the activities of the unit, the technical support provided by the CEWARN unit at the head office, and the various training and re-trainings provided based on regular needs assessment. By stating this, however, it shall not be implied that there are no obstacles to the operation of the early warning unit. There are indeed obstacles and they are treated in a subsequent section.

Creation of a body of knowledge

Aside from its use for early response, the early warning system has generated a body of knowledge on the nature of pastoral conflict and its implication for the lives and livelihoods of pastoral communities in the cluster. This body of knowledge would be relevant to interested academic, and government policy-makers. It would also be relevant to NGOs and other development agents to elaborate conflict sensitive development and peace-building programs.

Weak institutional capacity of the CEWERU

The CEWARN protocol calls for the institutionalization of the CEWERU and also to be housed in the more suitable location as member states decide. Currently, the CEWARN in Ethiopia is housed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Whether this is the appropriate institution to house the CEWERU or not is a question. Even leaving this question aside, the CEWERU as it stands now lacks a strong institutional capacity. The response unit does not have a budget, a dedicated staff and nor does it have regulation governing its relationship with member institutions. This has created a problem for its performance despite the obvious existence of an underlying political will. The actions undertaken by CEWERU in response to the two alerts were ad-hoc in nature. In the near future, CEWERU is likely to have its staff increased and rules and regulation are currently drafted that will help structure its functions.

Absence of Local Committee

One component of the CEWERU, the local committees, has not been yet established . The creation of these committees is crucial for the effectiveness of CEWERU. Their establishment will increase the response options, improve the formulation of response strategies and enhance the effectiveness as well as sustainability of early actions. These committees will also be crucial in providing early warning information to the NRI and CEWERU, in addition and parallel to the FMs’s observations. Clear rules and procedures should be drafted outlining the functions of the committees, guide their relation with the steering committee and CEWERU office located at the federal level.

Absence of collaboration mechanisms with structures outside CEWERU

There are various actors relevant for the work of CEWERU that have no formal relation with the unit. These agencies include CSOs and government bodies at various levels of government. It would be difficult to incorporate all these actors in the CEWERU structure. However, to establish a formal collaboration mechanism or network with these institutions would certainly enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of CEWERU activities. For instance, as the case study showed, there already exists a bilateral mechanism, a joint-border commission, that has been created to handle cross-border issues. And the CEWERU has referred one of the issues to this commission. This kind of collaboration should be emulated with other agencies.

Poor communication Infrastructure

One of the cardinal elements of early warning system is the timeliness of the early warning information. If early warning reports are not based on real time information, they will loose their essence. In this regard, due to the poor communication infrastructure in the areas of reporting, the FMs are facing difficulties in sending their reports on time. In addition, due to lack of awareness about the CEWARN mechanism in the area, the FMs are facing difficulties in collecting information relevant to early warning.

There are now steps undertaken by the NRI to resolve these issues through contacting the officials at the district level and encouraging their assistance to the FMs. As a result, some improvements are being observed. The creation of local committee and establishment of working mechanism with other actors, in this regard, are also very important to resolve the issue once and for all.

Heavy reliance on field reports from FMs

The FMs are the beginning and end of CEWARN’s data collection. The early warning reports produced by the NRI heavily depend on the incident and situation reports sent by the FMs. Notwithstanding the importance of this information from the FMs, there is, however, a downside risk from relying exclusively on these field reports. There is a possibility that FMs could report biased information or withhold important information to the benefit of their own group as most of them come from the same communities he/she is stationed. There is also possibility that the FMs can miss incident or other important events due to the distance of the area he/she covers. These risks are well noted by the NRI and are frequently raised by CEWARN. There are now measures undertaken by the NRI to decrease this reliance. The CCs are now collecting secondary data about the area as well as are establishing linkage with other sources, such as MPs, NGOs staff who are active and have knowledge about the area. The creation of local committee will also help in this area.

Lack of minimum criteria or threshold to initiate alerts

There is lack of minimum criteria/threshold to initiate alerts. The two alerts produced so far were solely based on the judgments of CCs and FMs in view of past patterns of pastoral conflicts in the area. Although analytical judgments are important, more formal minimum criteria/threshold should also be developed to avoid the potential of false alarms and squandering of resources that would be mobilized to respond to these false alerts. There is also the need to develop a common understanding with the response units on when to initiate early action.

Conclusion

The CEWARN mechanism in Ethiopia has been operational since 2003. All key components of the system have been established in some form, except for the local committees. Since its inception the mechanism has produced a number of early warning reports and alerts. Most of these reports were reviewed and adopted, and the alerts in particular generated useful early actions. The mechanism in its short period of existence has already scored a number of achievements, but has also faced many challenges. The challenges have been identified. The mechanism has begun undertaking a number of measures to overcome them. Creating local committees drawn from government and CSOs, diversifying the sources of early warning information, and building their institutional capacity are some of these measures. If these measures are fully implemented, and accompanied by periodic performance assessment, then the CEWARN mechanism can become an effective tool to prevent and mitigate internal and cross-border conflicts.      

About the author

Bizusew Mersha Ashagrie holds a BA in Political Sciences and International Relations from the Saint Joseph High School and a MA in International relations (2004) of the University of Addis Ababa . He serves currently as the Assistant Country Coordinator for CEWARN in Ethiopia . He has previously worked as assistant regional coordinator for the Inter Africa Group (IAG) and held several positions with the SGS in Addis Ababa .

For quotation, refer to this article as follows:

Bizusew, Mersha, Achievements and Challenges of the CEWARN Mechanism in Ethiopia, in An Early Warning System for Sudan, edited by Dominique Wisler and Eltayeb Haj Ateya, Khartoum, Coginta, 2007

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