A Conflict Early Warning System As Support of the comprehensive peace agreement

Jakkie Cilliers

In the context of the fragility of the peace and the absence of a fully functioning, legitimate state system across much of Sudan after several decades of war, the establishment of a neutral conflict prevention and early warning capacity dedicated to support the political transition could fill an urgent void, that of the provision of independent information and analysis.

When it comes to the application of early warning theory to conflict prevention practice, we need to ‘mind the gap’ – reflected in a 1996 report on early warning:

“There appears to be two forms of early warning: one in theory and one in practice. …While international organizations frequently articulate an interest in conflict prevention, in practice they are almost solely concerned with the settlement or management of existing disputes.”[i]

Different to intelligence systems that serve a national security purpose with a focus is on high quality and often secret sources of information, early warning systems typically serve intergovernmental purposes and are based on networks and open sources for their information. Early warning systems originated with the requirement (within humanitarian relief agencies) for a single, reliable source of analysis to serve a coalition of clients rather than a single government. Domestically conflict early warning systems are complex and fraught with all kinds of problems since they are easily be perceived to be agents of or hostile to state security interests within the context of an undemocratic or non-responsive state – or, as is the case in Sudan – where state power is contested.

Some General Pointers

Generically the aim of conflict early warning is to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent response strategies can be formulated to either prevent violent conflict or limit its destructive effects. Effective early warning involves the collection and analysis of data in a uniform and systematized way and according to a commonly shared methodology. It requires the formulation and communication of analysis and policy options to relevant end-users – information towards action.

In a basic form, conflict early warning needs to tackle:

·        Which issues (manifestations, precipitating, proximate and root causes) underpin and drive the conflict?

·        Which factors put a brake on conflict and serve as the basis for peace?

·        Who are the main stakeholders in the conflict?

·        What are the practical options available to policy-makers who wish to affect the emerging conflict, avoid human suffering in the short term and move toward a sustainable settlement in the longer term?

Figure 1: Schematic display of a conflict EWS[ii]

The timely communication and engagement with policy-makers - to close the loop from analysis to action. These are all highly political and partisan questions within Sudan and within the region and considerable thought would have to go into designing a system and in the choice of partners in such a system.

CEWARN in the Horn of Africa

The African Union’s Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) at continental level and regional systems including that of CEWARN system under the umbrella of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Africa were established to avoid inter-state conflict and secondly to stop national problems from becoming regional headaches. CEWARN is, however, more specific and focused than that found elsewhere in Africa .

Article 5 on the functions of CEWARN reads, in part, as follows:

“1) The functions of CEWARN cover both early warning and response and shall include the following:

            a) Promote the exchange of information and collaboration among member states on early warning and response on the basis of the following principles:

i)          timeliness

ii)         transparency

iii)        cooperation

iv)        free flow of information

b) Gather, verify, process and analyse information about conflicts in the region according to the guidelines provided in the Annex.

c) Communicate all such information and analysis to decision makers of IGAD policy organs and the national governments of Member States.”

The annex to the CEWARN protocol that sets out the ‘Operating Guidelines for CEWARN’, reads, in part, as follows:

“Part I: Mandate

1) CEWARN is mandated to:

a.     receive and share information concerning potentially violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region;

          b.     undertake and share analyses of that information;

          c.     develop case scenarios and formulate options for response;

d.     share and communicate information, analyses and response options;

e.     carry out studies on specific types and areas of conflict in the IGAD region.

Currently CEWARN is primarily aimed at providing early warning to national response mechanisms located within an appropriate government ministry such as the Department of Foreign Affairs (in the case of Ethiopia) and the Office of the President, Provincial Administration and Internal Security (in the case of Kenya). It does so in respect of the following matters in the Annex to the CEWARN protocol:

“Part II: Information

1) CEWARN shall rely for its operations on information that is collected from the public domain, particularly in the following areas:

a.     livestock rustling;

b.     conflicts over grazing and water points;

c.     smuggling and illegal trade;

d.     nomadic movements;

e.     refugees;

f.      landmines;

g.     banditry.”

At the moment CEWARN focuses on the increasingly violent pastoral conflict along border areas that is fuelled by the availability and presence of small arms. This followed a detailed analysis of the enduring nature of the various cross-border problems and the debilitating impact that armed cattle theft has in the region. The signature of the CEWARN protocol on January 9 2002 was followed by a series of expert workshops and consultancies that eventually provided the substantive theoretical basis for the subsequent system.

CEWARN is in many ways unique. On the one hand it exists as part of IGAD. On the other it draws heavily on civil society participation. This hybrid is arguably possible since national agencies and civil society organizations from one country naturally coalesce and mobilize in support of common national interests. This has allowed for the uncontested integration of the national components of CEWARN, the so-called CEWERU’s (Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit) into state structures in countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya where they are seen to complement existing state security and delivery structures.

Figure 2: Current CEWARN areas of engagement

In simple terms CEWARN appointed field monitors provide incident and weekly reports through a dedicated National Research Institute to the CEWERU within the country concerned. The CEWERU reports to the CEWARN unit in Addis Ababa where the data is codified and where quality control is performed. Based on a sophisticated analysis and reporting tool, CEWARN puts out monthly and alert reports.

Currently CEWARN is active in two clusters (as pilot projects), namely the Karamoja ( Uganda , Kenya , Sudan , Ethiopia border) and Somali ( Ethiopia , Kenya , Somali) clusters. Apparently a welcome expansion into the Sudan/Uganda border area is being considered.

Beyond the technical and conceptual challenges associated with early warning and response, the single biggest challenge faced by all early warning and response systems is linking good analysis with timely action. The linkage to timely action means clarity, proximity and engagement with those institutions responsible for action. In the case of CEWARN there is a complicated and somewhat distant relationship between the system and its response mechanism (national governments, the IGAD secretariat and its political masters) that still has to prove itself in practice. Without the mechanisms to harness and focus political will to action by IGAD Member States, the danger is that CEWARN may not be able to operationalise its conflict prevention ambitions at the regional level” Admittedly this comment does not give credit to the second and potentially fruitful focus of CEWARN, namely to initiate and support local conflict prevention working with and through local structures.

“Technically, the CEWARN system is complex and authoritative but has not yet closed the gap between analysis, options and actions. It is difficult to see how this will be possible in the longer term without the co-location of CEWARN (in Addis Ababa) and IGAD (in Djibouti) and the development of an integrated conflict prevention, management and response system similar to that working in West Africa and under development in Southern Africa. Without the mechanisms to harness and focus political will to action by IGAD Member States, the danger is that CEWARN may not be able to operationalise its conflict prevention ambitions at the regional level.”[iii]

Admittedly this conclusion does not give credit to the second and potentially fruitful focus of CEWARN, namely to initiate and support local conflict prevention working with and through local structures.

Early warning systems are necessarily tailored to their particular function and client(s). Each end-user (such as the Peace and Security Council of the AU) necessarily needs a system to meet its particular needs, resources, organizational culture and response mechanisms. CEWARN in the Horn is a particularly distinct and carefully designed system to meet particular and specific requirements. But equally the early warning system for the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council in West Africa differs from that being developed for Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.

This view leads to two obvious conclusions. On the one hand a degree of practical skepticism appears to be warranted on the idea that Africa would be able to develop an integrated CEWS system. It is more likely that the AU and each regional economic community (REC) would develop an own system tailored to the specific requirements and usage of each organization within a loose cooperative relationship between systems. More relevant to this paper, it probably rules out the option of expanding the CEWARN (dedicated to pastoral conflict across common borders) system for use in the Sudan (i.e. at national level) without considerable adaptation.

An Early Warning System for the Sudan

The fact that CEWARN may not be appropriate for use in support of the transition process in Sudan should not detract from the requirement for a system of conflict early warning to:

·        Provide independent information on the state of (in)security/the implementation of the peace process in an objective and non-partisan manner to the Government of National Unity (GoNU) in Khartoum, the Government of Southern Sudan in Juba, participating State governments, the UN system, donors/partners and critically, ordinary Sudanese.

·        Initiate local conflict prevention action (for example through links with tribal leaders) or inform prevention action at the State or national level.

Given the limited information flows in Sudan , any system would have to rely upon field monitors in each participating State for the provision of event data. Each participatory State could probably be ‘covered’ by an average of five field monitors - costing less than $1’000 per month per State. These monitors would have to be trained and have access to appropriate communication means with one of the two coordination unit, one in Khartoum (for the GoNU) and the other in Juba (for the Government of Southern Sudan) and it would have to build in appropriate accountability and consultative mechanisms through which all key stakeholders are brought to the table. Each of the two coordination units would require an office, computers, a minimum of three staff with guaranteed power supply and internet access. Additional provision would have to be made for dissemination, liaison functions, a briefing room replete with maps and graphs, as well as additional experts to feed and add in the analysis that is generated by various other components with in the UN and other systems. In contrast to the cautious approach adopted by CEWARN, a public dissemination strategy in the interests of its primary beneficiaries - ordinary Sudanese – is a key success factor for such a system. Once quality assurance and information dissemination/outreach systems have been put in place the only outstanding item would be the development of geographical information presentation tools.

The practical phases in the establishment of this system are relatively straightforward and consist of: the choice and customization of an established system, baseline research, implementation (deployment and training) and maintenance.

Choice of software: Time and cost considerations would favour the choice of an established and mature system such as the Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA) that has, amongst others, been adopted by FAST International and customized for pastoral conflict by CEWARN. Fully-fledged IDEA systems have a wide focus and include more than two hundred different event types that would require limited additional input for application in the Sudan . System costs are difficult to estimate but could range from say $30’000 (including customization) to several hundred thousand dollars if developed commercially.

Base-line study: All conflict response systems start off with a base-line assessment on the level of insecurity and threats to human security – and such an assessment is absolutely critical in the Sudan to build sustainable peace. Sudan does not have sufficient or appropriate data upon which to plan much of the post conflict reconstruction and development projects that are unfolding at the moment and that will do so in the years that lie ahead. Perhaps the most pressing of these examples relate to the information requirements upon which to plan the various security sector reform projects that are needed. Various mechanisms exist that could assist in this regard, including crime victimisation studies and the like. A number of applied research survey techniques and related efforts could help fill the information gap that will inevitably constrain and limit response strategies.^[iv]

Implementation: The most important aspect of implementation would be the choice of the hosting institution, oversight and political/domestic ownership considerations. The associated processes would imply a series of participatory workshops with political and civil society actors, various training activities and the identification of the parameters of the system (for example the decision on which States would be covered), definition of the types of events, etc.

Maintenance: Refresher training, ongoing quality assurance, IT and other ongoing support, including support from the software system supplier. Given the intensity that will be required from a Sudan human security early warning system output would be high - probably requiring weekly rather than monthly reports.

It would be crucial for a Sudan conflict early warning system to be able to feed off the extensive applied research that is being done for the multitude of agencies engaged with the transition process. To this end the establishment of the system discussed in these pages should be complemented by a research and analysis capacity that can access and digest these results.

Conclusion

In an ideal world there would be little impediment for the various negotiating parties in Sudan to agree on the establishment of a neutral and separate system that tracks conflict or security concerns in the country.[v] In the real world, control of information flows is deeply political and security is not a neutral, value-free concept. The political independence and integrity of a conflict early warning system for the Sudan and the choices regarding the organizations/institutions with which it is formally affiliated and of its key staff are critical matters if such a system is to survive and traverse the turbulent domestic politics of Sudan – in many ways more important than the challenges presented by the diverse ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity and limited infrastructure that will inevitably complicate implementation.

While this paper did not discuss the re-engagement of Sudan within the current operations of CEWARN, this is an obvious requirement if the region is to move towards a regional conflict response mechanism. Having Sudan commit fully and unequivocally to the commitments reflected in the CEWARN protocol would be good for Sudan , the region and for IGAD. The Horn of Africa faces many challenges of which armed resource competition across borders is a key ingredient. With peace in the Sudan the opportunities and demands that will be placed on CEWARN to extend its operations along the complex and divisive boundaries in the south (in particular) present numerous challenges, as would Darfur and the situation in the East. Once CEWARN has expanded to cover these additional border areas the major challenge for IGAD remains the development of a comprehensive response system at the national and regional level similar to that under development in other regions such as ECOWAS.

Nothing written in this paper can detract from the ultimate responsibility for domestic security that must lie with the government of Sudan and its various agencies. Any measures in support of the transition in Sudan should therefore have, as its ultimate purpose the building of state systems and act in support of legitimate post-transition national institutions. A conflict early warning system for Sudan can, therefore, only be of a transitory nature. The challenge for Sudan is the absence of legitimate national systems in the interim and the vagrancies of the transitional period that lie ahead that will severely degrade the capacity of national security agencies and institutions. The development of a dedicated system to track conflict trends related to (in)security in support of the Sudan peace process should therefore be seen for what it is – a temporary arrangement that should, in time, become part of the state system or fade away. Yet at the current stage of the peace process a conflict early warning system could go a long way to removing the provision of key conflict information from contested political control. Ideally such a system should be developed with the full cooperation and support of the parties to the CPA, the parties to the talks on Darfur and elsewhere. This ‘best’ solution may, however, not be practically achievable within reasonable time. While is theoretically possible for the UN to establish an independent mechanism to monitor and track violence in Sudan, or for donors to fund various Sudanese partners to perform such a function, the option to appoint an independent neutral agent to implement (but not staff) an early warning system or to create an entirely new unit for this purpose in the Sudan may be less desirable but inevitable.

About the author

Jakkie Cilliers has B Mil (BA), Hons BA, MA (cum laude) and D Litt et Phil degrees from the Universities of Stellenbosch and South Africa . He co-founded the Institute for Defence Policy during 1990 which subsequently became the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Since 1993 Dr Cilliers has served as Executive Director of the ISS. Awards and decorations include the Bronze Medal from the South African Society for the Advancement of Science and the H Bradlow Research Bursary. Dr Cilliers has presented numerous papers at conferences and seminars and is a regular commentator on local and international radio and television. He regularly lectures on security issues and has published, edited and contributed to a large number of journals, books and other publications, serving on a number of boards and committees.

For quotation, refer to this article as follows:

Cilliers, Jackie, A Conflict Early Warning System As Support of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in An Early Warning System for Sudan, edited by Dominique Wisler and Eltayeb Haj Ateya, Khartoum, Coginta, 2007

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