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Towards an Early Warning System for Conflict Prevention in Sudan

Omer Egemi

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed between the National Congress Party (NCP) and SPLM/A on 9 January 2005, has been globally recognized and commended for bringing to an end one of Africa 's longest and bloodiest civil wars. The CPA also represents a remarkable opportunity for restoring peace and the social contract between the state and society in Sudan . A quick glance to Sudan, however, tells that the peace process remains extremely fragile and is systematically threatened by the proliferation of local level conflicts over most parts of the country and the numerous latent conflict situations under conditions of widespread presence of armed militias, apparent social frustration and the conspicuously unstable partnership between the two parties to the peace process. This calls for concerted efforts to deal with the issue of conflict prevention and the creation of an enabling social and political environment in which conflict could be dealt with effectively. A prerequisite for constituting such an environment is the setting of an effective early warning system that helps to deal with conflict prevention, crisis management and post conflict rehabilitation. This will be the focus of this paper.

Some theoretical considerations

Societal conflict is a universal phenomenon, intrinsic to the process of social change. It is inevitable so long as material and social resources are unequally distributed within society. Such equity is usually reflected in political, social and cultural relationship between groups. One researcher[i] remarked “Struggle over symbolic processes are conflict over material relations of production, the distribution of resources, and ultimately power”. One of the salient features of conflict is its susceptibility to prevention and transformation.

Conflict is an intense experience in communication and interaction with transformative potential. For marginal groups seeking to redress injustices or extreme inequities in resource distribution, conflict is an inherent feature of their struggle for change, Buckles and Rusnak (1999[ii]).

Following the above prevention, as a theoretical concept is concerned with predictability and detection. In practice prevention is continuously confronted with the problem of the building of a society and the practical challenges to do so (Doom 1995[iii]). This makes the issue of prevention essentially governance issue and, therefore, should take seriously into account the restoration of the relationship between the state and society and, by definition, the way power and interests are contested and defended and of the ultimate question: the desirability of intervention within the existing structures and the perceived required reforms.

Mapping conflict in Sudan : the complexity of issues

Currently conflict is recognized as major cause of poverty and risk in Sudan . The magnitude of the problem and its socioeconomic, political, ecological and security costs indicate that the problem is pervasive in nature, transcending issues of the local to affect the very basis of survival of the State and people alike. Objective scrutiny of the problem reveals that it is a structural process caused by interconnectedness among political, social, economic and ecological factors of underdevelopment that have historically institutionalized poverty, social inequalities and marginalization[iv] under a situation characterized by crushing poverty, extreme frustration with the peace process, deep feelings of insecurity, injustices and powerlessness, spread of small arms and light weapons, prevalent culture of belligerence and an apparent social despair and distrust in the state as the legitimate and ultimate organizer of human affairs in the country.

Major conflict situations in present-day Sudan could be summarized as follows:

·        Crisis in Darfur, conflict in the East and the escalation of conflict around the Hamadab Dam in North Sudan

·        Local level conflicts that are currently straddling the rainlands of Sudan , and are essentially of resource-based nature between pastoralists and farmers

·        Social polarization and mobilization of identities built around the reconstitution of tribe and tribalism. Typical examples include jallaba vs. others; Dinka vs. Mysserriya; pastoralists vs. agriculturalists; urban vs. rural; Bedaweit vs. Belaweit; Gharraba vs. riverine, etc)

·        Conflict over administrative boundaries

·        The issues of IDPs and returnees

·        The rights of communities dislocated by investment capital, namely oil, mechanized agriculture and Hamadab Dam.

·        The unperceived and usually miscalculated/ignored power of the poor and marginalized (the creativity of public activity)

·        Cross boarder movements and conflicts ( Chad , Eritrea , DRC, Uganda , Egypt )

·        The confrontational aspects of power over authority and state control including issues of ideologies

·        Conflicts over cattle raiding and resulting, especially in Upper Nile State

Existing institutional environment for conflict prevention: need for change

The existing institutional environment for conflict prevention and transformation could be generally described as a constraining environment with the following manifestations:

·        The CPA: in spite of its relevance and potential powers as a process, it suffers inherent weaknesses, principally because of its exclusive nature

·        The unstable and somewhat belligerent partnership between the NCP and SPLM/A and the associated delays in the implementation process; this has constantly remained a cause of frustration and a source of widespread social pessimism that even doubts the completion of the Interim Period

·        Lack of public ownership of knowledge about not only conflicts, but essentially the real causes of conflict. Absence of basic research in Sudan during the last 15 years, poor and manipulated media coverage and the perceived fears, real and imagined, from state repression are important aspects of the problem

·        Lack of credible and appropriate institutional structures fully mandated and legitimated to deal with conflict;

·        The weak functioning of the decentralization process; the centralized authoritarian mentality is still prevalent.

·        Local traditional structures that had historically served as a major institution for conflict prevention and transformation[v] has been radically weakened; besides being repeatedly and explicitly accused of being highly politicized and manipulated.

·        Weak frameworks and capacities for development planning and implementation

·        Ineffective participation and under representation of Sudanese communities in the decision making process.

·        The conflict insensitive education curriculum, including university education

·        Poor capacities of the state to provide security and protection

An institutional structure for early warning

Appreciating the realities of contemporary and the challenges ahead, the need for an early warning system for conflict prevention is undisputable. The prerequisite for such a system seems to be the existence of a legitimated, capable, independent and socially owned institutional structure (centre?), branched down to States and with possible links to research institutions, to serve as the main think-tank for conflict prevention while providing guidance and policy directives based on collective and participatory decision-making processes resulting from research, in depth analysis and wide participation from all levels of the society. The institutionalization and success of Famine Regulations System introduced and applied by the British colonial administration provides available experience to learn from[vi]. The proposed structure is envisaged to fill the currently apparent institutional vacuum and is anticipated to serve the following specific objectives:

·        Conflict Research and Analysis, whereby policy research and analysis will be undertaken to enhance the preventative potential of development programming in conflict and post-conflict environments. Substantive policy analysis tools of Early Warning Systems (EWS), Early Warning Reports (EWR), and conflict analysis tools, to be used to monitor socio-economic and political indicators and to assess institutional capabilities and identify trends which may precipitate the onset of crisis in high-risk situations. This will also serve the objectives of information availability, consistency, and dissemination. Attaching meanings to indicators will be an important aspect of the process.

·        Promotion of policy dialogue, by providing a platform for government officials, civil society organizations, academics, traditional leaders and the international community to engage in constructive policy dialogue on peace-building and conflict prevention and the implementation mechanisms. Particular focus needs to be given to the need for inter-relating modern governance structures and traditional structures of conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms. Through such participatory mechanisms, the Centre is expected to generate viable policy options for concrete actions for conflict prevention and security

·        Capacity building, Building the skills and aptitude, of key institutions and individuals, for progressive leadership, constructive negotiation, consensus building and mediation to help national and local participants in building social peace. Particular focus should be given to capacity building needs at state and local levels.

·        Advocacy for conflict prevention, whereby the Centre will be committed to advocate for and mainstream conflict prevention in development policies and frameworks and throughout the Sudanese society, with a focus on conflict and conflict-prone areas. This involves also the use of media programmes, particularly radio, as well as through other non-conventional mechanisms.

Some pressing challenges

·        Early warning information vs. intelligence systems where there is always the legitimated fear of mixing between the two. The experience of Sudan during the devastating famine of the mid 1980s vividly illustrates that[vii]. This also involves quality control over information.

·        The confused objective of early warning between alarm and commitment to action taking. This is a very grey and tricky area that needs to be seriously considered. Who is to take the action and what measures are there/required to ensure the appropriate actions and implementation of decisions?

·        The confusion associated with the present political framework of national, sub national, state level and probably later on Darfur and the East, it becomes legitimate to question who is planning for whom and how the decision making process will be harmonized.

·        Links and relationship to regional dynamics and related structures and readiness to learn and draw lessons from relevant experiences, in and outside Sudan .

·        With the current weaknesses of the decentralization process a big dichotomy seems to exist between the local and the macro, at least in the sense of localized problems and centralized resources.

·        Apparent challenges to the proposed structure include: Issues of independence, social ownership, representation, inclusiveness and resourcing.


[i] Moore (1996)

[ii] Buckles, D and Rushnak, G., “Conflict and collaboration in natural resource management”, in Daniel Buckles (ed), Cultivating peace: conflict and collaboration in natural resource management, IDRC/ World Bank, 1999.

[iii] Ruddy, Doom, Early warning and conflict prevention, Minerva's Wisdom, 1995

[iv] Surveying the appalling socioeconomic conditions under which the Beja are living and the disastrous effects of the commercialization of the Gash and Tokar Deltas on the Beja, M.D. Ismail, a Beja activist wrote in Kifah al Beja, 1953:In Eastern Sudan there are tribes, which are no less primitive than those of the South. The Beja have not asked, and will not ask, for separation, but they may well ask for something, that looks like separation”. In Egemi (1994) The political Ecology of Subsistence Crisis in the Red Sea Hills, Ph.D Thesis, University of Bergen, Norway.

[v] Tribal conferences, functional till the Native Administration was dissolved in 1970, were particularly constituted and successfully managed to function as an important institutional structure for conflict prevention and transformation

[vi] As early as 1920s and in response to the repeated famine outbreaks in the country, the British administration established a set of famine regulations to deal with famine and famine prevention. The essential components of these regulations were:

·      Provisions for discovering and dealing with the f amine; these included most of what is known today as disaster management and early warning system. The main indicators and signals employed were rainfall amount and distribution, records of the Nile, conditions of animals and crops, prices of foodstuffs and animals, death rates and prevalence of diseases among human and animal population.

·      An articulated progressive system of reporting and decision making, from the Native Administration, as a legitimate institutional structure of governance at the low level, to Governor General of Sudan up to London

·      Provision of employment for the able bodied through the opening of relief work programmes and assistance of people to reach work places

·      Food distribution in villages

·      Tax remission during periods of difficulty and stress

·      An articulated system of reporting

·      Famine regulations were put into effect from 1920 in the Red Sea Hills until faded in 1970 when the attention was shifted towards the resettlement of the Hadendwa outside the Red Sea Province.

 

[vii] By September 1983 people in N Darfur and N. Kordofan started to see the ghost of famine marching around their areas as a result of the sever drought and failure of crops and pastures. Exhausting all of their coping mechanisms and hungry as they were, they started moving in groups to Khartoum seeking refuge and sustenance. Upon arrival all intelligence reports reported them as conspirers and part of a big political move similar to that of 1976 intended to overthrow Nemeiri’s regime. The immediate result was that they were all put on trucks backs and returned back home to die of hunger.

About the author

Omer Egemi received his M.A. in resource management ( University of Khartoum ) and his PhD in Environmental politics ( University of Bergen , Norway ). Professor Egemi is a staff member of the Department of Geography, University of Khartoum (since 1984). He joined UNDP in 2002 managing a project on Reduction of Resource Based Conflict in Sudan . Since January 2005 he serves as the Team Leader of the UNDP Conflict and Resource Management Unit. He has an extensive knowledge of the Sudan and in particular the regions of the East, Darfur and Nuba Mountains . He is a specialist of pastoralism, land tenure issues and local conflicts.

For quotation, refer to this article as follows:

Egemi, Omer, Towards an Early Warning System for Conflict Prevention in Sudan, in An Early Warning System for Sudan, edited by Dominique Wisler and Eltayeb Haj Ateya, Khartoum, Coginta, 2007

© 2007 by Dominique Wisler and Eltayeb Haj Ateya. All rights reserved. Short sections of this text, not to exceed two paragraphs, might be quoted without explicit permission provided full credit is given to the source

 

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