Omer
Egemi
The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed between the National Congress Party
(NCP) and SPLM/A on 9 January 2005, has been globally recognized and commended
for bringing to an end one of
Africa
's longest and bloodiest civil wars. The CPA also represents a remarkable
opportunity for restoring peace and the social contract between the state and
society in
Sudan
. A quick glance to Sudan, however, tells that the peace process remains
extremely fragile and is systematically threatened by the proliferation of local
level conflicts over most parts of the country and the numerous latent conflict
situations under conditions of widespread presence of armed militias, apparent
social frustration and the conspicuously unstable partnership between the two
parties to the peace process. This calls for concerted efforts to deal with the
issue of conflict prevention and the creation of an enabling social and
political environment in which conflict could be dealt with effectively. A
prerequisite for constituting such an environment is the setting of an effective
early warning system that helps to deal with conflict prevention, crisis
management and post conflict rehabilitation. This will be the focus of this
paper.
Some
theoretical considerations
Societal
conflict is a universal phenomenon, intrinsic to the process of social change.
It is inevitable so long as material and social resources are unequally
distributed within society. Such equity is usually reflected in political,
social and cultural relationship between groups. One researcher[i]
remarked “Struggle over symbolic processes are conflict over material
relations of production, the distribution of resources, and ultimately power”.
One of the salient features of conflict is its susceptibility to prevention and
transformation.
Conflict
is an intense experience in communication and interaction with transformative
potential. For marginal groups seeking to redress injustices or extreme
inequities in resource distribution, conflict is an inherent feature of their
struggle for change, Buckles and Rusnak (1999[ii]).
Following
the above prevention, as a theoretical concept is concerned with predictability
and detection. In practice prevention is continuously confronted with the
problem of the building of a society and the practical challenges to do so (Doom
1995[iii]).
This makes the issue of prevention essentially governance issue and, therefore,
should take seriously into account the restoration of the relationship between
the state and society and, by definition, the way power and interests are
contested and defended and of the ultimate question: the desirability of
intervention within the existing structures and the perceived required reforms.
Mapping
conflict in
Sudan
: the complexity of issues
Currently
conflict is recognized as major cause of poverty and risk in
Sudan
. The magnitude of the problem and its socioeconomic, political, ecological and
security costs indicate that the problem is pervasive in nature, transcending
issues of the local to affect the very basis of survival of the State and people
alike. Objective scrutiny of the problem reveals that it is a structural process
caused by interconnectedness among political, social, economic and ecological
factors of underdevelopment that have historically institutionalized poverty,
social inequalities and marginalization[iv]
under a situation characterized by crushing poverty, extreme frustration with
the peace process, deep feelings of insecurity, injustices and powerlessness,
spread of small arms and light weapons, prevalent culture of belligerence and an
apparent social despair and distrust in the state as the legitimate and ultimate
organizer of human affairs in the country.
Major
conflict situations in present-day
Sudan
could be summarized as follows:
·
Crisis
in Darfur, conflict in the East and the escalation of conflict around the
Hamadab Dam in
North Sudan
·
Local
level conflicts that are currently straddling the rainlands of
Sudan
, and are essentially of resource-based nature between pastoralists and farmers
·
Social
polarization and mobilization of identities built around the reconstitution of
tribe and tribalism. Typical examples include jallaba vs. others; Dinka vs.
Mysserriya; pastoralists vs. agriculturalists; urban vs. rural; Bedaweit vs.
Belaweit; Gharraba vs. riverine, etc)
·
Conflict
over administrative boundaries
·
The
issues of IDPs and returnees
·
The
rights of communities dislocated by investment capital, namely oil, mechanized
agriculture and Hamadab Dam.
·
The
unperceived and usually miscalculated/ignored power of the poor and marginalized
(the creativity of public activity)
·
Cross
boarder movements and conflicts (
Chad
,
Eritrea
, DRC,
Uganda
,
Egypt
)
·
The
confrontational aspects of power over authority and state control including
issues of ideologies
·
Conflicts
over cattle raiding and resulting, especially in
Upper
Nile
State
Existing
institutional environment for conflict prevention: need for change
The
existing institutional environment for conflict prevention and transformation
could be generally described as a constraining environment with the following
manifestations:
·
The
CPA: in spite of its relevance and potential powers as a process, it suffers
inherent weaknesses, principally because of its exclusive nature
·
The
unstable and somewhat belligerent partnership between the NCP and SPLM/A and the
associated delays in the implementation process; this has constantly remained a
cause of frustration and a source of widespread social pessimism that even
doubts the completion of the Interim Period
·
Lack
of public ownership of knowledge about not only conflicts, but essentially the
real causes of conflict. Absence of basic research in
Sudan
during the last 15 years, poor and manipulated media coverage and the perceived
fears, real and imagined, from state repression are important aspects of the
problem
·
Lack
of credible and appropriate institutional structures fully mandated and
legitimated to deal with conflict;
·
The
weak functioning of the decentralization process; the centralized authoritarian
mentality is still prevalent.
·
Local
traditional structures that had historically served as a major institution for
conflict prevention and transformation[v]
has been radically weakened; besides being repeatedly and explicitly accused of
being highly politicized and manipulated.
·
Weak
frameworks and capacities for development planning and implementation
·
Ineffective
participation and under representation of Sudanese communities in the decision
making process.
·
The
conflict insensitive education curriculum, including university education
·
Poor
capacities of the state to provide security and protection
An
institutional structure for early warning
Appreciating
the realities of contemporary and the challenges ahead, the need for an early
warning system for conflict prevention is undisputable. The prerequisite for
such a system seems to be the existence of a legitimated, capable, independent
and socially owned institutional structure (centre?), branched down to States
and with possible links to research institutions, to serve as the main
think-tank for conflict prevention while providing guidance and policy
directives based on collective and participatory decision-making processes
resulting from research, in depth analysis and wide participation from all
levels of the society. The institutionalization and success of Famine
Regulations System introduced and applied by the British colonial administration
provides available experience to learn from[vi].
The proposed structure is envisaged to fill the currently apparent institutional
vacuum and is anticipated to serve the following specific objectives:
·
Conflict
Research and Analysis, whereby policy research and analysis will be undertaken
to enhance the preventative potential of development programming in conflict and
post-conflict environments. Substantive policy analysis tools of Early Warning
Systems (EWS), Early Warning Reports (EWR), and conflict analysis tools, to be
used to monitor socio-economic and political indicators and to assess
institutional capabilities and identify trends which may precipitate the onset
of crisis in high-risk situations. This will also serve the objectives of
information availability, consistency, and dissemination. Attaching meanings to
indicators will be an important aspect of the process.
·
Promotion
of policy dialogue, by providing a platform for government officials, civil
society organizations, academics, traditional leaders and the international
community to engage in constructive policy dialogue on peace-building and
conflict prevention and the implementation mechanisms. Particular focus needs to
be given to the need for inter-relating modern governance structures and
traditional structures of conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms. Through
such participatory mechanisms, the Centre is expected to generate viable policy
options for concrete actions for conflict prevention and security
·
Capacity
building, Building the skills and aptitude, of key institutions and individuals,
for progressive leadership, constructive negotiation, consensus building and
mediation to help national and local participants in building social peace.
Particular focus should be given to capacity building needs at state and local
levels.
·
Advocacy
for conflict prevention, whereby the Centre will be committed to advocate for
and mainstream conflict prevention in development policies and frameworks and
throughout the Sudanese society, with a focus on conflict and conflict-prone
areas. This involves also the use of media programmes, particularly radio, as
well as through other non-conventional mechanisms.
Some
pressing challenges
·
Early
warning information vs. intelligence systems where there is always the
legitimated fear of mixing between the two. The experience of
Sudan
during the devastating famine of the mid 1980s vividly illustrates that[vii].
This also involves quality control over information.
·
The
confused objective of early warning between alarm and commitment to action
taking. This is a very grey and tricky area that needs to be seriously
considered. Who is to take the action and what measures are there/required to
ensure the appropriate actions and implementation of decisions?
·
The
confusion associated with the present political framework of national, sub
national, state level and probably later on Darfur and the East, it becomes
legitimate to question who is planning for whom and how the decision making
process will be harmonized.
·
Links
and relationship to regional dynamics and related structures and readiness to
learn and draw lessons from relevant experiences, in and outside
Sudan
.
·
With
the current weaknesses of the decentralization process a big dichotomy seems to
exist between the local and the macro, at least in the sense of localized
problems and centralized resources.
·
Apparent
challenges to the proposed structure include: Issues of independence, social
ownership, representation, inclusiveness and resourcing.

[iii]
Ruddy, Doom, Early warning and conflict prevention, Minerva's Wisdom, 1995
[v]
Tribal conferences, functional till the Native Administration was dissolved
in 1970, were particularly constituted and successfully managed to function
as an important institutional structure for conflict prevention and
transformation
·
Provisions
for discovering and dealing with the f amine; these included most of what is
known today as disaster management and early warning system. The main
indicators and signals employed were rainfall amount and distribution,
records of the Nile, conditions of animals and crops, prices of foodstuffs
and animals, death rates and prevalence of diseases among human and animal
population.
·
An articulated progressive system of reporting and decision
making, from the Native Administration, as a legitimate institutional
structure of governance at the low level, to Governor General of Sudan up to
London
·
Provision
of employment for the able bodied through the opening of relief work
programmes and assistance of people to reach work places
·
Food distribution in villages
·
Tax remission during periods of difficulty and stress
·
An articulated system of reporting
·
Famine regulations were put into effect from 1920 in the Red
Sea Hills until faded in 1970 when the attention was shifted towards the
resettlement of the Hadendwa outside the Red Sea Province.
[vii]
By September 1983 people in N Darfur and N. Kordofan started to see the
ghost of famine marching around their areas as a result of the sever drought
and failure of crops and pastures. Exhausting all of their coping
mechanisms and hungry as they were, they started moving in groups to
Khartoum
seeking refuge and sustenance. Upon arrival all intelligence reports
reported them as conspirers and part of a big political move similar to that
of 1976 intended to overthrow Nemeiri’s regime. The immediate result was
that they were all put on trucks backs and returned back home to die of
hunger.
About
the author
Omer
Egemi received his M.A. in resource management (
University
of
Khartoum
) and his PhD in Environmental politics (
University of Bergen
,
Norway
). Professor Egemi is a staff member of the Department of Geography,
University
of
Khartoum
(since 1984). He joined UNDP in 2002 managing a project on Reduction of
Resource Based Conflict in
Sudan
. Since January 2005 he serves as the Team Leader of the UNDP Conflict and
Resource Management Unit. He has an extensive knowledge of the
Sudan
and in particular the regions of the East, Darfur and
Nuba
Mountains
. He is a specialist of pastoralism, land tenure issues and local conflicts.
For
quotation, refer to this article as follows:
Egemi,
Omer, Towards an Early Warning System for Conflict Prevention in Sudan, in An
Early Warning System for Sudan, edited by Dominique Wisler and Eltayeb Haj
Ateya, Khartoum, Coginta, 2007
©
2007 by Dominique Wisler and Eltayeb Haj Ateya. All rights reserved. Short
sections of this text, not to exceed two paragraphs, might be quoted without
explicit permission provided full credit is given to the source