Making Prevention Rhetoric Work: the Need for Effective Political Early Warning

Heinz Krummenacher

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated in his 2001 report on the “Prevention of Armed Conflict” that it was high time to leave the rhetoric of conflict prevention behind us and to create a culture of prevention. Five years later we have to acknowledge that Mr. Annan’s appeal has not been heard, or may have been heard but not been put into practice. There is still no culture of prevention in international politics, and when violent conflict appears at the horizon, the behaviour patterns of decision makers are most often reactive instead of pro-active. Why? Why were we unable to realize the Secretary General’s vision to address politically motivated violence? On the other hand, why is it so much easier to introduce preventive thinking and acting in cases where emergencies are caused by environmental or man-made natural disasters?

There are basically two sets of explanations, one of a more technical nature while the other has to do with politics. Let me first address the technical aspects.

Prevention of violent conflict requires early warning! Without functioning early-warning systems, there is no such thing as effective conflict prevention. But early warning – if you want to make it work – poses some real challenges. By definition, early warning consists of three steps:

·        systematic collection of conflict-relevant data;

·        analysis of this data; and

·        transfer of analytical insights into practice.

These three steps require answers to distinct questions: First, what data is to be collected? What is relevant, and what is not? To this end, it is paramount to know what we want to warn of! Are we concerned with issues of stability and instability? Are we looking at ethnically or religiously motivated conflict or violent conflict in general? Or, are we focusing on human-rights violations, environmentally related conflict, crime, etc. Second, which method(s) do we use to analyze the data? Are we using quantitative analysis? Or do we want to rely exclusively on qualitative expert assessments? Third, what is the time frame of our warning (one month, three months, one year, or five years)? Whom do we want to warn? Who would be the appropriate recipient or end-user of our analysis and warning? Finally, and most important, how do we feed the information into decision-making processes?

All these questions can be answered, but implementing an early-warning mechanism is not a trivial task. Above all it presupposes intellectual rigidity in clearly defining the theoretical foundations and methodological steps involved. Let me outline this by giving you some insight into the early-warning system for which I am responsible – the FAST International Early Warning Program. We answered the questions I just raised as follows:

1. Collection of conflict-relevant data

First of all we believe in a multi-method approach by using both structural (qualitative) and event data (quantitative). The quantitative analysis is based on event-data analysis and the respective tools developed by a number of scholars, primarily from the USA . The logic of event-data analysis is fairly simple: all events considered relevant to conflict escalation and de-escalation are assigned a certain numeric value according to a distinct conflict scale (IDEA = Integrated Data for Event-Data Analysis). These values can then be added up for specific time intervals and graphically displayed in a curve over time. It goes without saying that the quality and quantity of the data is crucial for the success of such a method. In an unique manner, information collected by FAST International does not rely on dispatches from news agencies – which is standard practice in event-data analysis – but on in situ-recruited and well-trained local information networks (LINs).

2. Analysis of information

The local information networks are composed of indigenous professionals whose access to and understanding of local information far exceeds that of international media commentators. FAST LINs feature two major advantages:

·        area-wide coverage, meaning that our network covers regions and provinces that hardly ever find their way into the international media’s headlines, and

·        continuous reporting, which guarantees that coverage is not subject to boom topics or media hypes of the international news media.

By combing quantitative and qualitative analysis provided by both local and international experts, FAST International produces state-of-the-art risk analyses.

3. Transfer of analytical insights into practice

I mentioned above that transforming early-warning signals into concrete action is a sine qua non requirement in any early-warning exercise. At the same time, it is arguably also the most difficult step, because we need to identify adequate entry points for our information within state and non-state bureaucracies. It is quite easy to come up with sound analyses and well thought-out recommendations. However, if we fail to identify and reach those in a position to take effective action, all our efforts are to no avail. While FAST International has managed to tailor-make its products so that decision-makers can easily use them, the ideal entry points for early-warning information have not yet been found in all cases.

While these technical obstacles can be dealt with, it is still utterly difficult to link early-warning signals to early action and to make early warning work. The reasons for this are manifold:

·        Sometimes decision makers think that they do not have the appropriate means at their disposition to implement early-warning measures.

·        Sometimes another crisis is perceived as even more pressing and therefore absorbs all attention as well as all human and financial resources.

·        Sometimes officials simply refuse to listen to outside experts, because they find it hard to implement policies that have been generated outside the power structure.

All these technical challenges and bureaucratic obstacles abound, yet the so-called early-warning – early-response gap (the fact that early warning does not automatically trigger action) has little to do with bureaucratic inertia or incompetence. Resistance towards early warning is deeper rooted. It originates in the fact that nation states still unconditionally cling to the norms of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Early warning seems to be incompatible with these concepts. As long as this attitude prevails, the “culture of prevention” will remain a dream.

The author:

Heinz Krummenacher received his M.A. (1982) and PhD (1985) in political science from the University of Zurich . He started his professional career with the Swiss Defense Department where he directed a study group dealing with the re-definition of Swiss security policy (1985-1989). Between 1990 and 1992 he served as foreign editor with the Swiss daily newspaper Der Bund. Before joining SwissPeace in 1998, he was head of the social research department at IHA-GfK, a leading market research institute (1992-1998). At SwissPeace he is the managing director and head of the early warning program FAST International. In addition, he is a member of the UN staff college's Early Warning Preventive Measures training unit. Among his most recent publications are: “Computer Assisted Early Warning – the FAST Example” (2006), “Global Terrorism – Symptom of Local Conflicts” (2004), and “Prevention and Power Politics: Central Asia as a Show Case” (2001).

For quotation, refer to this article as follows:

Heinz Krummenacher, Making Prevention Rhetoric Work: the Need for Effective Political Early Warning, in An Early Warning System for Sudan, edited by Dominique Wisler and Eltayeb Haj Ateya, Khartoum, Coginta, 2007

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